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NOTES
THE GENETIC DEFENSE: EXCUSE OR EXPLANATION?
The conference was to bring together historians, scientists, soci-
ologists, philosophers, criminal justice experts, and legal scholars.
The experts were to focus on the "role of genetic research and
technology in predicting, explaining and controlling criminal be-
havior."1 The discussion was postponed indefinitely, however,
when the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") withdrew funding
just months before the scheduled October 1992 date amid a furor
of public controversy 2 Although the official proposal stressed that
its purpose was simply to "[identify and] clarify the methodologi-
cal, legal, and ethical issues raised by the development and use of
techniques for identifying and treating criminal predispositions,"3
the NIH claimed that the program too readily accepted and gave
credence to the notion that violence and crime had genetic causes. 4
Other critics, more vehement in their attack, charged that the con-
ference perpetuated racist misconceptions and embodied either a
"politically-fueled revival of the discredited theories of eugenics ' 5
or "reductionism gone wild."'
The heated debate over the 1992 conference was generated
largely by the growing body of scientific reports suggesting links
between human biology and antisocial behavior. Yet the theory
that one may be born with a genetic predisposition toward crime is
not new. In the past, criminality has been associated with every-
1. Proposed "Genetic Factors in Crime" Conference Agenda (University of Maryland In-
stitute for Philosophy and Public Policy, 1991) (on file with the William and Mary Law
Review) [hereinafter "Genetic Factors in Crime"].
2. See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, New Storm Brews on Whether Crime Has Roots in Genes,
N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 15, 1992, at C1.
3. "Genetic Factors in Crime," supra note 1.
4. Goleman, supra note 2, at Ci.
5. Vince Bielski, Hunting the Crime Gene, S.F. WEEKLY, July 15, 1992, at 13.
6. Id.
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thing from race 7 to physical features' and body structure.' Due to
serious methodological weaknesses and a general lack of knowledge
concerning the human body, however, early advocates of "biologi-
cal criminology" were ultimately discredited and overshadowed by
proponents of environmental determinism, who viewed socially de-
viant behavior not as a physiological function, but as the result of
the molding effects of environmental forces. 10
Few experts today dispute the significant impact of social and
cultural influences on human behavior. Nevertheless, recent devel-
opments in genetics and related fields have prompted criminolo-
gists to reconsider some forms of antisocial behavior as manifesta-
tions of physiological dysfunction."- As one expert has suggested:
7. LAWRENCE TAYLOR, BORN TO CRIME 18 (1984). For example, in the early 1900's, Amen-
can anthropologist E.A. Hooton conducted extensive physiological studies on male prison-
ers. After comparing the inmates' physical measurements with noncriminal males, Hooten
attributed the primary cause of crime to "biological inferiority," and further linked different
racial and antisocial groups with characteristic patterns of crime. See generally EARNEST A.
HOOTON, THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL. AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY (1939).
8. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 18. In the late 1800's, Italian physician Cesare Lombroso
claimed that "criminal type" could be identified by physical characteristics such as excessive
hair, long earlobes, large jaws, and slanting foreheads. According to Lombroso, carriers of
these traits, or "inferior throwbacks," possessed a biological predisposition to aggression and
violence. CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES (Henry P Horton trans.,
1918).
9. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 18-19. In 1949, William Sheldon proposed that human be-
havior was strictly a function of body structure. Id. In support of this theory, Sheldon cited
data revealing that of the three physiological structures-ectomorphs (linear), endomorphs
(soft), and mesomorphs (muscular)-the proportion of mesomorphs among criminals was
nearly twice that among noncriminals. Id.
10. Id. at 17-20; see also Diana H. Fishbein, Biological Perspectives in Criminology, 28
CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1990) (characterizing findings of early biological determinists as "largely
unscientific, simplistic, and unicausal" and "globally rejected due to the inability of theo-
rists to posit a rational explanation for the development of criminal behavior"); cf. DOROTHY
NELKIN & LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS 11 (1989) (asserting that "the wide-
spread acceptance of biological reductionism declined after the Nazis implemented eugenic
ideas in the atrocities of WWII" and that, as it was no longer politically acceptable to view
biology as a guide to social policy, genetic explanations of human behavior were replaced by
cultural or psychological analyses).
11. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 70.
It is clear that human behavior is directly affected by biochemical factors. Ap-
plied to criminal behavior, it appears that the brain's biochemistry has a sig-
nificant role in activating and deactivating the aggressive mechanisms that
cause the very antisocial behavior that sociologists insist is the exclusive result
of environmental influences. Certainly, environmental influences can be rele-
vant to the causation of hostile conduct. But just as certainly, physiological
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"[I]n the interplay of the brain and nervous system with hormones
and chemicals, are the answers to much of the behavioral puz-
zle."12 The modern "genetic theory" posits that conduct is a "joint
product of genetic and environmental variation" in which
"[g]enotype gives an initial direction to development.' 3 In other
words, genetic factors are the "first stage of the causal sequence"
that determines human behavior. 4
Current initiatives such as the Human Genome Project 5 further
predict that genetic "mapping," or the association of specific chro-
mosomal segments with certain physical manifestations, will soon
enable the detection of potentially disruptive conditions.'"
factors-both inherited and acquired-are at least as important. The answer
probably lies somewhere us a complex interreaction of the two. But it is a terri-
ble mistake to ignore the critical role that hereditary biochemistry plays in the
causes of criminal conduct.
Id.
12. Fishbein, supra note 10, at 241.
13. David C. Rowe & D. Wayne Osgood, Heredity and Sociological Theories of Delin-
quency: A Reconsideration, 49 A. Soc. REv. 526 (1984).
14. Id. at 527.
15. The Human Genome Project, a $3 billion, 15-year worldwide research effort, has be-
gun to analyze the structure and sequence of human DNA and to decipher the genetic in-
structions encoded in nucleotide bases. Genes consist of the hereditary chemical DNA and
ultimately control every process human cells perform. Once a gene is located on a chromo-
some and its DNA sequence is mapped, scientists can determine what particular function
that gene performs, identify aberrant sequences, and recognize "markers"-unque seg-
ments that can be followed from one generation to the next-as indicators of particular
biological properties of afflictions. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NEW TOOLS FOR ToMORROw's HEALTH RESEARCH (1991) (discussing the goals of the Human
Genome Project); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, THE U.S.
HuMAN GENOME PROJECT. THE FIRST FivE YEARS (1990) (reviewing the aims of the project
and explaining the method of implementation).
16. Intensive mapping of human genes has been actively realized only recently. See THE
U.S. HuhiAN GENOME PROJECT. THE FIRST FIvF YEARS, supra note 15, at 9. As early as 1975,
however, sociobiologist E.O. Wilson predicted:
[I]t is possible, and us my judgment even probable, that the positions of genes
having indirect effects on the most complex forms of behavior will soon be
mapped out on the human chromosomes. These genes are unlikely to prescribe
particular patterns of behavior; there will be no mutations for a particular sex
practice or mode of dress. The behavioral genes more probably influence the
ranges of the form and intensity of emotional responses, the thresholds of
arousals, the readiness to learn certain stimuli as opposed to others, and the
pattern of sensitivity to additional environmental factors
TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 32.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
This Note examines the concept of criminal responsibility in the
context of past and present scientific data. First, the Note explores
the fundamental philosophical premises of our current criminal
justice system, a model based upon the notion of free will and lim-
ited causal excuse. 17 Following an analysis of prior judicial reaction
to "biologically based" claims and defenses,"' the Note surveys a
sampling of recent scientific studies relating biological conditions
to antisocial behavior.'9 The Note concludes by evaluating the ade-
quacy of the current legal system in dealing with new scientific
findings and suggesting a partial revision of the basic concepts of
criminal responsibility and punishment.20
In light of increasing knowledge and understanding, traditional
yet outdated notions of freedom and responsibility should be mod-
ified to square with a scientific view of human conduct. This revi-
sion should recognize that certain individuals are physically and
innately different from the "normal" person, and to a certain ex-
tent may not possess the same degree of free will in developing
conditions directly linked to antisocial behavior. Furthermore, ad-
mitting scientific evidence of genetic susceptibility would not nec-
essarily preclude penalizing deviant acts or immunize the afflicted
individual from criminal responsibility States could retain the au-
thority to deal with potentially dangerous individuals if, instead of
relying upon a subjective, moral culpability justification, the legal
system predicates responsibility upon the legitimate objectives of
social control and public welfare.
DEFINITIONS AND FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW
Crime, Punishment, and Excuse
Crime is defined as certain actions in certain circumstances (the
actus reus), the doing of which with a designated mental state (the
mens rea) is punishable.2' Whether particular conduct constitutes
unacceptable or appropriate behavior depends on communally con-
structed norms and beliefs; what one society designates a "crime"
17. See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 48-137 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 138-202 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 203-72 and accompanying text.
21. Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 258 (1987).
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another may not so label. 2 By their very nature, then, notions of
"crime" are subject to reconsideration based on the evolving
knowledge of human behavior.
An essential corollary to the characterization of an act as criminal
is that the act is thus deserving of punishment. Socially imposed
punishment is supported by four underlying objectives.2 - The first
is retribution, or the meting out of institutionalized vengeance.24
The second is incapacitation, or the removal of offenders from so-
ciety in order to prevent future harm.2 5 Third is deterrence, both
specific and general Specific deterrence is designed to prevent fu-
ture criminal acts by the individual offender. General deterrence
seeks to discourage others from committing such acts by instilling
fear of similar penalties.2 6 The fourth function of punishment is
rehabilitation. Through identification, education, and discipline,
the justice system attempts to benefit the indivdual and society by
reforming the offender.
Just as society defines certain acts as criminal, it also exempts
certain conduct from criminal liability Exculpation is available
when an actor can show either a justification or excuse for his be-
havior. An act is justified, for instance, when the surrounding cir-
cumstances make the person's actions, although technically a viola-
tion of the, law, the right thing to do. An excuse, by contrast,
denies culpability despite the fact that the individual has acted in
a socially unacceptable manner. In the latter case, some disability
in the person's freedom to choose right over wrong makes punish-
ment inappropriate.2 8
Under Anglo-American criminal law, excuses are based on a
"causal theory"- "When an agent is caused to act by a factor
outside his control, he is excused; only those acts not caused by
some factor external to his will are unexcused."29 Consequently, so-
22. See JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 22-23
(1985); Robert L. Bonn & Alexander B. Smith, The Case Against Using Biological Indica-
tors in Judicial Decision Making, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5 (1988).
23. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 10.
24. Id. at 10-11.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 11-13.
27. Id. at 13-15.
28. Kadish, supra note 21, at 258.
29. Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1985).
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ciety's definition and understanding of responsibility, or of the rel-
ative strength of free will against the external forces of causation,
is critical in determining a standard for liability
Free Will Versus Determinism and the Presumption of Free Will
According to basic tenets of Western philosophy, individual de-
velopment is dependent upon the unique human ability to exercise
free choice." Modern science challenges this proposition, however,
by providing support for the definition of an individual according
to pre-determined genetic characteristics.3' The tension is between
two conflicting perspectives of human behavior: free will and
determinism. 2
The doctrine of free will dictates that all human behavior is pro-
duced through the intent and agency of the individual.33 Determin-
ism, by contrast, proposes that every event, including human ac-
tions and volitions, has a cause;34 conduct is always the product of
some matrix of causal factors that necessarily determines choice. 5
Akin to the theory of determinism is that of "genetic essentialism,"
which suggests that personal traits are predictable and permanent,
determined at conception, and "hard-wired" into the human con-
stitution. Genetic essentialism minimizes the importance of ex-
periences and social relations in determining human behavior, and
effectively negates free will.37
As previously noted, whether an act is deemed "criminal" and
whether it is subsequently "excused" is dependent upon society's
conception of the strength of human volition, or free will, versus
the power of external causation, or determinism. Our present sys-
tem of criminal justice recognizes that neither paradigm explains
30. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 313, 317 (1992).
31. Id. at 318 (noting that although the detection of DNA markers "yield[s] only proba-
bilistic information," research in molecular biology has given proponents of biological deter-
minism "new respectability").
32. Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 2245, 2246 (1992).
33. Id.
34. Moore, supra note 29, at 1112.
35. Boldt, supra note 32, at 2246.
36. Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 30, at 320-21.
37. Id. at 321.
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human conduct completely or perfectly and incorporates funda-
mental tenets of each into the determination of criminal status and
appropriate punishment. For example, the "causal theory" holds
an individual responsible for his or her conduct unless that indi-
vidual can prove that the conduct resulted from an independent
cause; the model therefore presumes free will while providing lim-
ited recognition for the implications of determinism.38 For a num-
ber of reasons, however, including lack of adequate understanding
of the human constitution and broader social policy considerations,
Anglo-American criminal responsibility has been adjudged and
sentenced primarily according to a free will paradigm. 9
Our current legal system operates pursuant to an "as if" the-
ory 40 This approach accepts the truth of determinism yet adopts
an "as if" view of human freedom. In other words, society should
design institutions as if human action was not determined. 41 Pro-
ponents of this scheme recognize that determinism may be the first
postulate of science, but choose free action as the first postulate of
legal and moral thought.4 According to philosopher Jerome Hall:
[Psychiatry] purports to be rigorously scientific and therefore
takes a determinist position. Its view of human nature is ex-
pressed in terms of drives and dispositions which, like mechani-
cal forces, operate in accordance with universal laws of
causation.
On the other hand, criminal law is not a theoretical sci-
ence whose sole concern is to understand and describe what goes
on. It is, instead, a practical, normative science which, while it
draws upon the empirical sciences, is also concerned to pass
judgment on human conduct.43
38. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
39. See John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsi-
bility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045 (1988) (discussing the difficul-
ties posed by the clash of free will and environmental influence theories).
40. Moore, supra note 29, at 1121; see also Hill, supra note 39, at 2045.
41. Moore, supra note 29, at 1121.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1121-22 (quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 425, 455
(2d ed. 1960)) (citations omitted).
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In essence, "the law treats man's conduct as autonomous and
willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if
it were."44
Thus, the classical Anglo-American conceptions of legal and
moral responsibility presuppose humans to be free and autono-
mous agents who make deliberate choices and who, depending
upon resulting consequences, are ultimately praiseworthy or
blameworthy for their chosen actions.45 Modern science and psy-
chiatry, by contrast, understand humans to be products of the laws
of nature, whose behavior is ultimately understandable and pre-
dictable as a function of the causal matrix that governs everything
in the universe.46 Under the "as if" theory, the legal system at-
tempts to reconcile the two paradigms by working out a form of
"rough justice." To accomplish this, the system presumes free will
and imputes criminal responsibility, but also allows for the uncon-
trollable influence of determinism by providing exculpatory de-
fenses or by mitigating resulting punishment.47
LEGAL PRECEDENTS
Courts have responded with varied degrees of receptivity to sci-
entific evidence suggesting a causal link between human behavior
and predetermined biological factors. Because a genetic defense
claim implies an impairment of free will, however, the judicial sys-
tem has been fairly consistent in aligning them with defenses
based on insanity and diminished mental capacity 48 Generally
speaking, to be relieved of criminal responsibility, defendants have
been required to rebut the presumption of free will by offering
proof of forces that negated their ability to choose or rationally
execute their actions.
44. Id. at 1122 (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74, 74-
75 (1968)). Moore quotes Packer further: " 'The idea of free will in relation to conduct is
not, in the legal system, a statement of fact, but rather a value preference having very little
to do with the metaphysics of determinism or free will.'" Id.
45. Hill, supra note 39, at 2045.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2045-46.




Some of the first cases to bring the theory of genetic defense to
modern judicial attention were those involving the "XYY Syn-
drome." In the 1960's, genetic researchers discovered that certain
persons possess either greater or fewer than the normal comple-
ment of two sex chromosomes. Further studies suggested either a
strong correlation or a causal connection between antisocial behav-
ior and the presence of an extra Y chromosome.4 9 For example,
surveys consistently reported that a disproportionate number ofinmates in maximum security institutions possessed the XYY com-
plement.50 Moreover, behavior assessments found that many of
these individuals suffered from severe personality disorders and
antisocial tendencies.5 As one study reported: " 'In most or all of
these patients intellectual capacity, sexual instincts, aggressive im-
pulses, and emotional responses all showed evidence of immatur-
ity, defective development, or inadequate control.' "52 Such find-
ings rekindled the age-old debate of nature versus nurture, and
confronted society with the questions of whether criminals are
born rather than made, and if born, to what extent genetic nature
diminishes criminal responsibility in a traditionally nurture-ori-
ented legal system.53
At the time, scientific knowledge regarding the connection be-
tween biology and crime was limited. Although most news media
discussion of the XYY anomaly conveyed the impression that a
causative link between the XYY chromosome defect and criminal
behavior had been established conclusively and that "genetic
criminals" were present in society, medical data neither supported
nor refuted these propositions. 4 Whereas links between chromo-
somal defects and physical abnormalities were well known, direct
49. Kenneth J. Burke, The 'XYY Syndrome' Genetics, Behavior and. the Law, 46 D.NV.
L.J. 261, 263-64 (1969).
50. Id. at 264-69.
51. Lawrence B. Kessler, Note, The XYY Chromosomal Abnormality: Use and Misuse in
the Legal Process, 9 HAxv. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 476-79 (1972).
52. Id. at 478 (quoting Price & Whatmore, Behavior Disorders and the Pattern of Crime
Among XYY Males Identified at a Maximum Security Hospital, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 533
(1967)).
53. Burke, supra note 49, at 261.
54. Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEo. L.J. 892, 894-95 (1969).
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evidence linking genetics with mental and behavioral problems was
relatively new 55 Scientists were aware that the presence or absence
of certain chemicals in the human brain were associated intimately
with behavioral changes, but they remained uncertain as to the de-
gree of causation or correlation. 6
Given this uncertainty, both the scientific and legal communities
acknowledged the need for a more satisfying demonstration of
cause and effect before adopting an excuse based strictly on ge-
netic makeup.5 7 Because no such evidence was then available, dis-
cussion of genetic data and its legal and social implications re-
mained speculative. 8 In addition, many commentators pointed to
empirical weaknesses such as methodological bias and lack of ade-
quate sample controls as factors limiting the utility of existing sci-
entific data."' Specifically, because the early studies focused pri-
marily on penal and mentally deficient populations, they supplied
little data on the prevalance and causal connection of the XYY
defect in the general population and gave an insufficient basis on
which to establish uniform theories. 60
In light of these shortcomings, courts consistently rejected the
XYY condition as a sufficient ground for excusing criminal behav-
ior. In People v. Tanner,6 for instance, the court concluded that
the concept of a "genetic criminal" had not been legally recognized
in the United States.6 2 Basing its ruling primarily on lack of ade-
quate proof, the court identified three basic deficiencies in the tes-
55. Burke, supra note 49, at 263.
56. Id. at 268.
57. See infra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
58. Id. at 269.
59. See, e.g., NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 10, at 3-50; Bonn & Smith, supra note 22,
at 5-6.
60. Kessler, supra note 51, at 898 n.25.
61. 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). Raymond Tanner was charged with kidnap-
ping, forcible rape, and assault with intent to commit murder. Id. at 657. Two court-ap-
pointed psychiatrists found Tanner to be a mentally disordered sex offender and committed
him to a state hospital for treatment. Id. After a six month stay at the hospital, doctors
reported that treatment was ineffective and criminal proceedings were restored. Id. At trial,
Tanner pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and sought to introduce evidence discov-
ered during his hospitalization that his cells possessed an extra Y chromosome. Id.
62. Id. at 658 n.3. The court did note, however, that the XYY syndrome defense had been
judicially recognized in other countries. Id. In Australia, for instance, an XYY criminal de-
fendant was acquitted by reason of insanity, and in France a convicted murderer with the
same condition received a mitigated sentence. Id.
[Vol. 35:353
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timony given by expert geneticists.6 3 First, the evidence had con-
ceded that criminal behavior could be a possible manifestation of
genetic abnormality without being a necessary incident of that
condition. 4 Second, the experts could not determine conclusively
whether the defendant's aggressive behavior actually resulted from
chromosomal abnormality 6 5 Finally, the evidence had failed to sat-
isfy the state's definition of legal insanity- no expert had testified
that the possession of an extra chromosome resulted in a mental
disease which impaired the defendant's ability to know the nature,
quality, or wrongfulness of his act. 6
In Millard v. Maryland,'7 the XYY defense similarly was re-
jected under the "substantial capacity" test for insanity "I Even
under this less rigorous standard, the court found the evidence in-
sufficient to establish genetic abnormality as a legal "mental de-
fect."6 9 According to the court, the test for lack of criminal respon-
sibility involved a two-prong inquiry, both components of which
must be satisfied. First, the accused must have suffered a "mental
disease or defect" capable of diagnosis by a trained psychiatrist
and based on "reasonable medical certainty ,,7o Moreover, the mere
63. Id. at 659.
64. Id. ("The evidence does not suggest that all XYY individuals are by nature invol-
untarily aggressive. Some identified XYY individuals have not exhibited such behavior.").
65. Id. Despite "voluminous and complex" evidence concerning recent research and medi-
cal literature on the subject, the court determined that "studies of the [XYY individuals]
undertaken to this time are few rudimentary in scope, and at best inconclusive."
Id. The court also referred to a law review article which stated that " 'presently available
medical evidence is unable to establish a reasonably certain causal connection between the
XYY defect and crunminal conduct.'" Id. (citing Kessler, supra note 51, at 904).
66. Id. at 658-59. The court stated that: "[t]he test of sanity [in California] is this: First,
did the defendant have sufficient mental capacity to know and understand what he was
doing, and second, did he know and understand that it was wrong and a violation of the
rights of another?" Id. at 658 n.4 (quoting CALJIC 801 (1967 Revision)).
67. 261 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970). Charged with robbery with a deadly weapon,
the defendant claimed that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime due to
his chromosomal abnormality. Id.
68. Id. at 231.
69. Id. The court conceded that, if believed, the testimony of the expert witness, a
learned and experienced geneticist, clearly established that the defendant suffered from a
genetic abnormality. Id. The testimony "also tended to show in a general way" that this
abnormality "caused him to be antisocial, aggressive, in continual conflict with the law, and
to have a 'propensity' toward the commission of crime." Id. Still, the court was not con-
vinced that the evidence satisfied the more demanding criteria for legal insanity. Id.
70. Id.
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presence of a cognizable mental defect would not suffice, by itself,
to show legal insanity unless the defendant could prove that be-
cause of such defect, he or she lacked the "substantial capacity ei-
ther to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law." 1 In the words of the
court: "[S]imply [to] state that persons are prone to [certain
criminal behavior] is hardly sufficient to rebut the presumption of
sanity and show the requisite lack of 'substantial capacity' ",72
People v. Yukl75 echoed the judicial conclusion that a genetic
imbalance theory of crime causation was not yet sufficiently estab-
lished or accepted to warrant admitting evidence of a biological af-
fliction.74 Rather than stating that the evidence failed to meet any
specific test of legal insanity, however, the court in Yukl held that
the scientific theory simply failed to meet the threshold eviden-
tiary test of admissibility 7' Importantly, the court did suggest that
future research efforts might lead to admissibility of a genetic the-
ory 70 Although at that time no "exact biological mechanism" or
causal connection had been identified to show a relationship be-
tween genetic composition and deviant behavior, the court
surmised: "The answers to these problems are currently being
sought by scientists and their solution will assist immeasurably in
providing a firmer footing for the incorporation of chromosome ab-
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The defendant, charged with murder, requested the
appointment of a cytogeneticist to conduct chromosomal tests to determine whether he pos-
sessed the XYY complement. Id.
74. Id. at 317-19.
75. Id. Although the court recognized the established existence of the XYY genetic phe-
nomenon, it determined that "the sampling, thus far, has been inadequate and inconclu-
sive," and reflected a "built-in bias" because of the institutionalized subject populations and
lack of proper control group data. Id. at 318. The court concluded: "Scientists and legal
commentators appear to be in agreement that further study is required to confirm the initial
findings and to concretely establish a causal connection between one's genetic complement
and a predisposition toward violent criminal conduct." Id. (footnote omitted); see also State
v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754, 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that the "presently available
medical evidence [was] unable to establish a reasonably certain causal connection be-
tween the XYY defect and criminal conduct"); Knight v. State, 538 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crin.
App. 1975) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying motion for medical examinations and
court appointment of experts to examine defendant to determine presence of XYY syn-
drome), overruled by Jackson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
76. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
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normality under the defense of insanity "7 The court thus pro-
posed a qualifying test:
[A]n insanity defense based on chromosome abnormality should
be possible only if one establishes with a high degree of medical
certainty an etiological relationship between the defendant's
mental capacity and the genetic syndrome. Further, the genetic
imbalance must have so affected the thought processes as to in-
terfere substantially with the defendant's cognitive capacity or
with his ability to understand or appreciate the basic moral code
of his society.71
Discovery of the "XYY Syndrome" presented courts with direct
evidence of genetic abnormality The series of cases did not result,
however, in the establishment of a successful genetic defense, as
courts held that absent convincing proof of causality, mere demon-
stration of a biological defect would not excuse criminal behavior.
Alcoholism and Chemical Addiction
Whereas relatively unexplored chromosomal aberrations like the
XYY condition have met with judicial scepticism, courts more
readily have addressed hereditary afflictions such as alcoholism
and chemical addiction as potentially relevant factors in determm-
ing moral culpability and appropriate sentencing. Still, although
the Supreme Court has held that the "status" or condition of
chemical addiction cannot be considered in and of itself a criminal
offense,7 9 courts have been reluctant to absolve completely those
whom the state has proven guilty of actus reus.80 More often, evi-
dence that an individual suffered from a biological abnormality has
been used to mitigate punishment for unlawful behavior.8 "
Condition Itself Not a Crime
In 1962, the Supreme Court held in Robinson v. California2 that
the "status" of chemical addiction alone is not a crime. In that
77. Id. at 319-20.
78. Id. at 319.
79. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
80. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533-35 (1968).
81. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
82. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
1993] 365
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case, a California statute made narcotic addiction a punishable of-
fense for which the individual could be prosecuted "at any time
before he reforms," even though he had never used or possessed
narcotics in California nor been guilty of any antisocial behavior
within the state.8s The Court struck down the statute on the
ground that it inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4 According to Robin-
son, equating a mere physical condition with criminality would be
as unjust as making mental illness or leprosy a criminal offense:
"We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we
allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to
be punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment cannot toler-
ate such barbarous action. '8 5
Perhaps most importantly, the Court characterized chemical ad-
diction as an illness or disease.8 8 As such, the condition was
deemed comparable to insanity, and under Anglo-Amercian law,
the insane are excused from punishment for criminal acts." In the-
ory, penal measures are justified for acts of transgression, whereas
mere affliction warrants treatment.88 Referring to the traditional
justifications for punishment, in his concurrence Justice Douglas
conceded the ineffectiveness of sanctions as a deterrent for status
crimes.8 9 Although criminal sanctions would be inappropriate," the
Court affirmed the legitimacy of selective State action for incapaci-
tation purposes.,1 Specifically, the Court maintained that a State
may determine that general health and welfare concerns require
83. Id. at 666.
84. Id. at 667. According to the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to states through
the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual puntshments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VIII (emphasis added).
85. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 678 (Harlan, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 666-67.
87. Id. at 668-69 (Douglas, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 674. Justice Douglas added that "[a] prosecution for addiction, with its result-
ing stigma and irreparable damage to the good name of the accused, cannot be justified as a
means of protecting society, where a civil commitment would do as well." Id. at 677.
89. Id. at 674 (stating that "[t]he belief that fear of punishment is a vital factor in deter-
ring an addict from using drugs rests upon a superficial view of the drug addiction process
and the nature of drug addiction").
90. Id. at 666.
91. Id. at 665.
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those who manifest symptoms of disease to undergo compulsory
civil treatment such as quarantine, confinement, or sequestration.92
Whereas mere physical status of chemical addiction may not be
deemed a criminal offense, in Powell v. Texas9 3 the Court held that
chronic alcoholism did not constitute a defense for active wrongdo-
ing. Unlike the Robinson depiction of addiction as an illness, the
majority in Powell asserted the "inescapable fact is that there is no
agreement among members of the medical profession about what it
means to say that 'alcoholism' is a 'disease.'" 94 If the condition
had gained recognition as an "illness," that designation functioned
solely to indicate a need for medical treatment. 5
Despite this preliminary refusal to recognize alcoholism as a
"disease" per se, the majority did not dismiss altogether scientific
evidence linking the condition with behavioral propensities. In-
stead, the Court indicated that the defendant had failed to demon-
strate that his condition in fact could be diagnosed within one of
the "subgroups" of alcoholism that purportedly qualified as a
debilitating disease, i.e., caused physiological dependence, compul-
sive behavior, and inability to abstain. 6 As with the XYY syn-
drome cases, the defendant had failed to provide sufficiently cer-
tain and scientifically accepted proof of an incapacitating
disorder.9 7
The Court in Powell further stressed the distinction between an
"exceedingly strong influence" and a "completely overpowering"
compulsion. In short, a degree of compulsion was not the same as
a complete lack of control.99 Recognizing the difficulty of separat-
ing compulsion from utter lack of free will, the Court attributed
92. Id. at 666.
93. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). In Powell, the defendant was convicted for public drunkenness.
94. Id. at 522. According to the Court, the "[d]ebate rages within the medical profession
as to whether 'alcoholism' is a separate 'disease' in any meaningful biochemical, physiologi-
cal or psychological sense, or whether it represents one peculiar manifestation in some mdi-
viduals of underlying psychiatric disorders." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 524.
97. See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
98. Powell, 392 U.S. at 524.
99. Id. at 524-25. "It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol he will
suffer [violent physical withdrawal]; it is quite another to say that a man has a 'compulsion'
to take a drink, but that he also retains a certain amount of 'free will' with which to resist."
Id. at 526.
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this "definitional confusion" not only to the "undeveloped state of
the psychiatric art," but also to the "conceptual difficulties inevita-
bly attendant upon the importation of scientific and medical mod-
els into a legal system generally predicated upon a different set of
assumptions.' ' 00 Holding the current state of scientific knowledge
inadequate to raise a legitimate physiological defense, the Court, as
in Yukl, intimated that more definite proof might lead to a more
successful claim: In order to make out a constitutional defense,
should one be recognized, a person would have to display both a
"loss of control" once he or she had begun to drink and an "inabil-
ity to abstain" from drinking in the first place. 1°1
As a basis for its refusal to allow chronic alcoholism as a legal
excuse, the Court emphasized the social benefits of imposing pun-
ishment upon those so afflicted. 102 Given the current lack of effec-
tive methods of therapy, the Court surmised that incarceration
might actually prove less burdensome than mandatory medical
treatment. For instance, penal incarceration usually has some
outside statutory limit, whereas civil commitment typically de-
mands confinement until one is "cured."' 03 Alcoholics, therefore,
would run the risk of being locked up for an indefinite period of
time with no greater hope of receiving effective treatment and no
prospect of guaranteed "freedom.' 0 4 In addition, the Court con-
cluded that the threat of criminal conviction may well deter unde-
sirable conduct. 0 5 Finally, the Court reaffirmed the legislative
right to impose criminal sanctions in order to protect society from
acts posing substantial health and safety hazards or offending
moral and aesthetic sensibilities. 10 6 As long as public welfare was
endangered by the affirmative conduct of the individual, criminal
punishment would not be considered "cruel and unusual," regard-
less of the causal forces behind the act:
The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the [Eighth
Amendment] is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if
100. Id. at 526.
101. Id. at 524-25.
102. Id. at 528-30.
103. Id. at 528-29.
104. Id. at 529.
105. Id. at 530-31.
106. Id. at 532.
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the accused has committed some act which society has an
interest in preventing. It thus does not deal with the ques-
tion of whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be pun-
ished because it is, in some sense, "involuntary" or "occasioned
by a compulsion."' 0 7
According to the majority, a constitutional biological defense
would be both difficult to administer from an evidentiary stand-
point and would pose a serious policy dilemma by opening the
floodgates for excusing "compulsive" behavior:
If [a defendant] cannot be convicted of public intoxication, it is
difficult to see how a State can convict an individual for murder,
if that individual, while exhibiting normal behavior in all other
respects, suffers from a "compulsion" to kill, which is an "ex-
ceedingly strong influence," but "not completely overpowering."
It is not difficult to imagine a case involving psychiatric testi-
mony to the effect that an individual suffers from some aggres-
sive neurosis which he is able to control when sober [but when
alcohol removes his inhibitions he engages in assaultive behavior
for which he should be constitutionally unaccountable]. 108
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, similarly focused on the
practical complexity of application, including the difficulty of de-
fining "disease," "symptomatic" conditions, "pattern," and the
requisite degree of "compulsion."' 1 9 He concluded: "The range of
problems created would seem totally beyond our capacity to settle
at all, much less to settle wisely, and even the attempt to define
these terms and thus to impose constitutional and doctrinal rigid-
ity seems absurd in an area where our understanding is even today
so incomplete.""10
107. Id. at 533. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black stressed the normative function
of penal sanctions:
Apart from the value of jail as a form of treatment, jail serves other traditional
functions of the criminal law. [I]t gets the alcoholics off the street, where
they may cause harm in a number of ways to a number of people, and isolation
of the dangerous has always been considered an important function of the
criminal law.
Id. at 539 (Black, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 534-35.
109. Id. at 546 (Black, J., concurring).
110. Id.
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Justice Black further emphasized the fundamental distinction
between scientific and legal realms. Even if scientific proof could
establish the presence of an "uncontrollable influence," thereby
eliminating the element of subjective culpability, that determina-
tion might not be relevant in the legal sphere, where primary con-
siderations include social control as much as moral blame."1 As
Black framed the issue:
The accused undoubtedly commits the proscribed act and the
only question is whether the act can be attributed to a part of
"his" personality that should not be regarded as criminally re-
sponsible. Almost all of the traditional purposes of the criminal
law can be significantly served by punishing the person who in
fact committed the proscribed act, without regard to whether his
action was "compelled" by some elusive "irresponsible" aspect
of his personality [M]edical decisions concerning the use
of a term such as "disease" bear no necessary correspon-
dence to the legal decision whether the overall objectives of the
criminal law can be furthered by imposing punishment.
[M]uch as I think that criminal sanctions should in many situa-
tions be applied only to those whose conduct is morally blame-
worthy, I cannot think the States should be held constitutionally
required to make the inquiry as to what part of a defendant's
personality is responsible for his actions and to excuse anyone
whose action was, in some complex, psychological sense, the re-
sult of a "compulsion." '112
Refusing to overturn common law concepts of personal accounta-
bility, the Court expressed confidence in existing legal doctrines
such as insanity, mistake, justification, and duress, and reaffirmed
the States' inherent authority to adopt new defenses corresponding
to their evolving understanding of human behavior. 113
111. Id. at 540-41.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 535-37.
We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection of inter-
locking and overlapping concepts which the common law has utilized to assess
the moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doc-
trines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have
historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the ten-
sion between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
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Although the majority opinion and Justice Black's concurrence
rejected the concept of a genetic defense, Justice Fortas' dissent
recognized the scientific and moral bases for creating such an ex-
ception." 4 Recognizing the difficulty of defining the concept of al-
coholism as a "disease," Fortas nonetheless asserted: "[I]ts core
meaning, as agreed by authorities, is that alcoholism is caused and
maintained by something other than the moral fault of the alco-
holic, something that, to a greater or lesser extent depending upon
the physiological or psychological makeup and history of the indi-
vidual, cannot be controlled by him."1 5 He then cited numerous
studies linking alcoholism with "physiological influences, such as
vitamin deficiency, hormone imbalance, abnormal metabolism, and
hereditary proclivity,"" 8' and strongly contested the putative util-
ity of pumshing afflicted offenders." 7
Fortas' rationale for the institution of a biologically-based excuse
ultimately rested not on scientific or sociological findings of fact,
but on more fundamental constitutional tenets: "The questions for
this Court are not settled by reference to medicine or penology
Our task is to determine whether the principles embodied in the
Constitution of the United States place any limitations upon the
circumstances under which punishment may be inflicted. MIS
Fortas located this limitation in the Eighth Amendment as read by
the Court in Robinson:
Robinson stands upon a principle which, despite its subtlety,
must be simply stated and respectfully applied because it is the
foundation of individual liberty and the cornerstone of the rela-
tions between a civilized state and its citizens: Criminal penal-
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of
adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States.
It is simply not yet the time to write into the Constitution formulas cast
in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear either to doctors
or to lawyers.
Id.
114. Id. at 561-66 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 560-61.
116. Id. at 561.
117. Id. at 562-65 (questioning the effectiveness of imprisonment for therapeutic, deter-
rent, and rehabilitative reasons).
118. Id. at 565-66.
19931
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:353
ties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition
he is powerless to change.11
Thus far, however, the Court has denied Eighth Amendment
protection to status offenders who are found guilty of active
misconduct.
Biological Condition as a Function of Free Will
In refusing to categorically equate afflictions such as alcoholism
with the legally recognized insanity defense, the Supreme Court
has emphasized the importance of the element of volition. In Tray-
nor v. Turnage,120 for example, the Court upheld the validity of a
statute denying federal benefits to any veteran who suffered from
alcoholism "not related to an underlying psychiatric disorder."''
Affirming the government's right to characterize nonpsychiatric-re-
lated alcoholism as "willful misconduct," the Court held that per-
sons bearing "some responsibility" for their disabilities could be
treated the same as those without disability 122 Unlike the deci-
sions in Robinson and Powell, in Turnage the majority declined to
tackle the question of "whether alcoholism is a disease whose
course its victims cannot control," and instead deferred to the leg-
islature: "It is not our role to resolve this medical issue on which
119. Id. at 567.
120. 485 U.S. 535 (1988). In Turnage, veterans who did not exhaust their education assis-
tance benefits within ten years following military service sought an extension. Id. at 538.
According to statute, an extension was permitted only if use of the benefits during the ten-
year period was prevented by a physical or mental disorder which was not the result of
"willful misconduct." Id. The veterans petitioned for the extensions on the ground that they
were disabled by alcoholism during much of the ten-year period. Id. The Court found that
the Veterans' Administration ("VA") regulation defining "primary" alcoholism (that which
is unrelated to an underlying psychiatric disorder) as "willful misconduct" did not violate
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which requires that federal programs not discriminate
against handicapped persons solely because of their handicap. Id. at 549-51.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 549-50. According to the Court:
Congress is entitled to establish priorities for the allocation of the limited re-
sources available for veterans' benefits, and thereby to conclude that veterans
who bear some responsibility for their disabilities have no stronger claim to an
extended eligibility period than do able-bodied veterans. Those veterans are
not denied benefits "solely by reason of [their] handicap," but because





the authorities remain sharply divided. . [These] arguments are
better presented to Congress than to the courts.
123
Justice Blackmun's dissent, by contrast, rejected the agency's
conclusive presumption of volition.124 After examining the evi-
dence, Blackmun found an absolute correlation between willfulness
and primary alcoholism scientifically unsubstantiated and based
upon impermissible stereotyping and generalization. 125 He con-
strued the statute instead to require an assessment of qualification
based on "reasoned and medically sound judgments,' ' 2  taking
into account the implications of current medical knowledge.1 27
Blackmun's dissent in Turnage, like that of Fortas in Powell,
allowed for the possibility that a genetic condition may effectively
negate an individual's free will, and therefore merit exception from
traditional theories of responsibility Unsupported by conclusive
evidene of causality, however, this possiblity has failed to rise to a
level of judicially recognized excuse.
"Genetic Predisposition" as a Potential Mitigating
Circumstance
Whereas courts have not accepted an absolute genetic defense,
some have permitted evidence of genetic predisposition as a miti-
123. Id. at 552.
124. Id. at 560-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 562-64. In evaluating the parties' respective scientific evidence, Blackmun
chastized the VA for the "meagerness of the medical support it summon[ed]," which "con-
sist[ed] of a hodgepodge of medical conclusions, some of only marginal relevance." Id. at
562. By contrast, Blackmun identified "ample evidence" supporting the petitioners' claims
that "the degree of willfulness associated with the onset of alcoholism varies from case to
case. Recent medical research indicates that the causes of primary alcoholism are varied and
complex, only some of which conceivably could be attributed to a veteran's will." Id. at 562-
63.
126. Id. at 554. According to Justice Blackmun,
this Court [has] explained in no uncertain terms that [the Rehabilitation Act]
bars the generic treatment of any group of individuals with handicaps based on
archaic or simplistic stereotypes about attributes associated with their disa-
bling conditions. Instead, [it] requires an individualized assessment of each
person's qualifications, based on "reasoned and medicalfy sound judgments."
Id.
127. Id. at 564 ("As the medical community's understanding of the causes of alcoholism
continues to develop, [the statute] requires the VA to take these new developments into
account in making 'sound medical judgments' about the source of a particular veteran's
alcoholism.").
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gating factor in sentencing if the defendant can prove a concomi-
tant impairment of volition. In Baker v. State Bar of California,12
for example, an attorney was charged with misappropriation of cli-
ent funds and other professional misconduct. Although the court
found the defendant guilty on all counts, it also ruled that his of-
fenses did not warrant disbarment, in part because of his genetic
predisposition to alcoholism. 129
By considering evidence of "genetic predisposition," the court
did not create an exception based purely on biological determin-
ism. In fact, the court expressly stated that "an attorney's alcohol-
ism is not a mitigating factor A physical, mental, or emo-
tional condition that adversely affects an attorney's ability to
practice may, if uncorrected, require disbarment in order to
protect the public."' 30 Instead, the court attached significance to
the defendant's biological condition only insofar as it affected his
free will, or conscious ability to control his behavior.' 31 Thus, the
true mitigating factor was not the defendant's genetic predisposi-
tion itself, but the fact that he was not conscious of his abnormal
susceptibility, and therefore could not adjust his behavior
accordingly-
[E]vidence that petitioner was not properly diagnosed ,and,
as a result, was not made aware of his genetic predisposition to
addiction, is mitigating. It lends support to his claim that, hav-
ing learned about his condition, he will continue to abstain I
and will not again relapse into the behavior that led to his past
misconduct.13
Underscoring its reliance on volition in granting mitigation, the
court held that after showing lack of knowledge of physical suscep-
tibility, an afflicted individual bears a "heavy burden" in demon-
strating that he has taken concerted, affirmative steps to correct or
overcome the effects of that precipitating condition.'33
128. 781 P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1989).
129. Id. at 1345.
130. Id. at 1352 n.6.
131. Id. at 1354-55.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1354.
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One year later, the California court encountered a case with al-
most identical facts. In In re Ewaniszyk,3 however, the convicted
attorney was disbarred despite proof of alcoholism. The court
found that evidence of the defendant's physical condition ex-
plained his misconduct, but did not sufficiently mitigate culpabil-
ity 135 Distinguishing Baker, the court held that Baker's demon-
stration of a genetic predisposition to addiction, coupled with
superior evidence of extended sobriety and hard labor provided
more "compelling" grounds for mitigation.13
6
Given that the two petitioners' records of rehabilitation were not
significantly different 3 7 the determining factor seemingly was not
simply possession of a genetic predisposition to chemical addic-
tion, but ignorance or misperception of this genetic handicap and
subsequent inability to avoid developing the latent condition.
Ewaniszyk may have been held to a greater degree of criminal re-
sponsibility because he failed to rebut the presumption that he
possessed the normal human capacity and control to resist devel-
oping such a condition.
RECENT SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
Most legal precedents rejecting genetic or physiological condi-
tions as legitimate grounds for excuse or mitigation have been
based on the premise that human behavior is predominantly the
product of free will.13 Although courts have acknowledged that
134. 788 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1990).
135. Id. at 695. The court found evidence of petitioner's abstention and change in lifestyle
after conviction "mitigating" but "not sufficiently compelling" to reduce the sentence of
disbarment. Id. The court supported this ruling by noting that petitioner had not partici-
pated consistently in a drug or alcohol program since his relocation, had repaid his victims
only after criminal charges had been brought against him, and had undertaken pro bono
work in part "to build his fledgling legal practice." Id. at 695-96.
136. Id. at 696.
137. In Ewamszyk, the petitioner offered evidence that he had admitted his alcoholism
and no longer had the urge to drink, had married and established a stable family life, and
had relocated and worked steadily as a law clerk since his suspension. Id. at 692. In Baker,
the petitioner demonstrated that he had voluntarily undergone rehabilitation, had main-
tained sobriety since his last hospitalization, had changed the nature of his law practice to
one that was less stressful, and had practiced without further complaint for three years.
Baker, 781 P.2d at 1355.
138. Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free
Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 615 (1988).
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certain severe mental disorders, such as insanity, may effectively
suppress volition or control and thereby relieve criminal responsi-
bility, they have not extended the exception to other forms of bio-
logical aberration."" The reluctance to expand the list of valid de-
fenses reflects both judicial malaise over the current state of
scientific knowledge and lack of evidentiary certainty The resis-
tance may also be attributable to the fear of undermining social
control and allowing potentially dangerous individuals to remain
unchecked by adopting a theory of biological determinism.
Strict adherence to an assumption of free will proves increas-
ingly problematic, however, as biochemical research and behavioral
studies have expanded exponentially and generated more convinc-
ing evidence of genetic predispositions. Specifically, experts have
succeeded in isolating neurological, metabolic, and ecological fac-
tors that aggravate or intensify behavioral disturbances by influ-
encing brain function and behavior.140
Criminality and Genetics
Experts have long recognized that certain conditions such as ju-
venile delinquency, personality disorders, and substance abuse
have a significant effect on antisocial behavior, and thereby have
an indirect effect on criminality 141 These same disorders have
been increasingly identified as having genetic origins. 42 People do
not possess certain "genes for crime"; criminality is undeniably
complex behavior involving an interaction of multiple risk fac-
tors.14 Equally persuasive, however, is empirical evidence that ge-
netic coding for structural proteins and enzymes influences meta-
bolic, hormonal, and other physiological processes. 44 Genetics thus
139. Id. at 616-17.
140. Diana H. Fishbein & Robert W Thatcher, New Diagnostic Methods in Criminology:
Assessing Organic Sources of Behavioral Disorders, 23 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 240-67
(1986); see also Denno, supra note 138 (providing extensive citations to and an examination
of behavioral studies).
141. THE CAUSES OF CRIME, at ix-x (Sarnoff A. Mednick et al. eds., 1987).
142. See, e.g., C. Robert Cloninger & I.I. Gottesman, Genetic and Environmental Factors
in Antisocial Behavior Disorders, in THE CAUSES OF CRIME, supra note 141, at 92.
143. See Michael Bohman et al., Predisposition to Petty Criminality in Swedish
Adoptees, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1233 (1982).
144. See NEw TOOLS FOR TOMORROW'S HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 15, at 10.
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may directly affect the risk of an individual's manifestation of
"criminal" behavior in particular environments.14
Indeed, a substantial number of studies have demonstrated that
the biological parents of a disproportionate number of delinquent
or antisocial children have criminal or antisocial histories. 1" For
instance, one study found that sociopathic and. alcoholic fathers
were twice as likely to have sociopathic offspring than fathers with-
out this condition. 147 Another study reported that from a sample of
adopted children diagnosed as psychopathic, biological fathers had
psychopathy five times as frequently as adoptive fathers.14
Extensive adoption studies similarly have noted a relation be-
tween the criminal convictions of biological parents and the crimi-
nal convictions of the children adopted from them.1 49 One set of
statistics revealed that if one biological parent, but neither adop-
tive parent, was criminal, the incidence of criminality in the
adoptee increased from ten percent to twenty-one percent.1 50 A
particularly strong correlation has been noted for chronic offend-
ers.1 51 One study reported that forty percent of the biological
145. Bohman et al., supra note 143, at 1233.
146. Denno, supra note 138, at 623 n.53.
147. Id. (citing LEE ROBINS, DEVIANT CHILDREN GROWN Up: A SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIAT-
RIC STUDY OF SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY 164 (1966)).
148. Id. at 624 n.53 (citing Fini Schulsmger, Psychopathy: Heredity and Environment, in
BiosocLL BASES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 109, 121 (Sarnoff A. Mednick & Karl 0. Christian-
sen eds., 1977)).
149. Id. at 623 n.53 (citing Cadoret, Psychopathy in Adopted-Away Offspring of Biologic
Parents with Antisocial Behavior, 35 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 176, 182 (1978); Crowe, An
Adoptive Study of Psychopathy: Preliminary Results from Arrest Records and Psychiatric
Hospital Records, 63 PROC. Am. PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL ASS'N 95, 100 (1975) (finding adoptees
born to female criminal offenders significantly more likely to engage in antisocial behavior
leading to arrest than a control group of nonoffenders' offspring); Crowe, The Adopted Off-
spring of Women Criminal Offenders, 27 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 600 (1972) (finding
that adoptees whose biological mothers had crminmal convictions had more legal problems
than those of nonoffenders)).
150. Id. (citing C. Robert Cloninger, The Antisocial Personality, 13 Hosp. PRAC. 97, 100
(1978)).
151. Sarnoff A. Mednick et al., Genetic Factors in the Etiology of Criminal Behavior, in
THE CAUSES OF CRIME, supra note 141, at 74, 90; see also Barry Hutclngs & Sarnoff A.
Mednick, Criminality in Adoptees and Their Adoptive and Biological Parents: A Pilot
Study, in BiosocIAL BASES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 148, at 127, 140.
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fathers whose sons were convicted for serious transgressions had
themselves been convicted for similar offenses. 152
The conclusion drawn from these studies seems clear: heredity
and gene.tics contribute significantly to the development of antiso-
cial or criminal behavior. In an effort to pinpoint the specific ori-
gins of deviant behavior, researchers have attempted to identify
relevant physiological processes and corresponding dysfunctions.' 53
Scores of studies have been generated in a range of fields, such as
neurology, psychophysiology, and endocrinology 154 Although the
results have not yet provided conclusive evidence of clear and di-
rect biological "causes" of crime, considerable data has emerged to
support the argument that genetics have a real and significant in-
fluence on the development and expression of human behavior."55
This Note does not provide an exhaustive, or even comprehensive,
compilation of current scientific findings. Instead, it presents a
sampling of certain relatively substantiated theories linking biol-
ogy and antisocial conduct.
Psychophyswlogy
Criminality may be viewed as an individual's failure to control or
suppress those kinds of behavior that society forbids.156 In search-
ing for a link between criminality and genetics, some experts have
focused on the offender's relative inability to learn how to become
a law-abiding person, or perhaps more accurately, how to avoid
certain kinds of unacceptable behavior. 157 Avoidance learning is
the process through which authority figures or official regulations,
by expressing disapproval, cause the offender to associate anxiety
152. Denno, supra note 138, at 623 n.52 (citing Sarnoff A. Mednick et al., An Example of
Biosocial Interaction Research: The Interplay of Socioenvironmental and Individual Fac-
tors in the Etiology of Criminal Behavior, in BiosociAL BASES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra
note 148, at 9, 16).
153. Fishbein, supra note 10, at 28.
154. See id.
155. See Bohman et al., supra note 143.
156. Gordon Trasler, Some Cautions for the Biological Approach to Crime Causation, in
THE CAUSES OF CRIME, supra note 141, at 7, 15.
157. See, e.g., W Buikhuisen, Cerebral Dysfunctions and Persistent Juvenile Delin-
quency, in THE CAUSES OF CRIME, supra note 141, at 168; Fishbein & Thatcher, supra note
140, at 242; P.H. Venables, Autonomic Nervous System Factors in Criminal Behavior, in
THE CAUSES OF CRIME, supra note 141, at 110.
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with these kinds of behavior-anxiety that can be dissipated only
by breaking off the sequence of behavior before it actually results
in transgression. 15 8 According to this model, the dissipation of anx-
iety "powers" the avoidance; rapid dissipation of anxiety means ef-
fective, reliable avoidance, whereas people who, for some reason,
dissipate anxiety slowly may not learn as readily to avoid socially
disapproved behavior. 159 Conversely stated, relative lack of fear
responsivity, ability to appreciate fear-provoking cues, and ability
to develop conditioned avoidance responses may be linked with
criminal behavior. 60
Anxiety dissipation has been associated with structural charac-
teristics of the central and autonomic nervous systems, functions
controlled directly by genetics.161 For example, a 1990 study found
that subjects who had been convicted of criminal behavior exhib-
ited significantly lower resting heart rates, skin conductance activ-
ity, and more slow-frequency electroencephalographic (EEG) activ-
ity than nonoffender subjects. 6 2  According to the test
administrators, the results were the first clear evidence that impli-
cated underarousal in all three response systems-electrodermal,
cardiovascular, and cortical-in the development of criminality 163
The reduction in the levels of the three physiological systems sug-
gested that a diffuse brain-stem arousal mechanism may be dys-
functional in criminals. 66 Although the scientists conceded that
the findings could not demonstrate causal relationships conclu-
sively, they nonetheless concluded that abnormal activity in the
genetically governed central and autonomic nervous systems may
indeed represent a predisposition to criminality 165
158. Venables, supra note 157, at 110.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Adrian Raine et al., Relationships Between Central and Autonomic Measures of
Arousal at Age Fifteen Years and Criminality at Age Twenty-Four Years, 47 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1003-07 (1990).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1003.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1003-07.
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Neuropsychology
Neuropsychology explores the relationship between the brain
and human conduct. l6" By examining critical cerebral functions
such as learning, problem solving, and memory, experts have iden-
tified several conditions which may impede an individual's ability
to perceive and process information, capacities essential for suc-
cessful avoidance learning and social adaptation. 1 7
As children grow up, they are confronted with a community that
expects them to behave in a certain way Ordinarily, primary care-
takers, usually the parents, are responsible for a child's socializa-
tion, or transmission of the norms and values of the surrounding
culture. The socialization process, however, does not depend solely
upon the child's social environment. Another crucial factor is the
individual's fitness to learn, or cognitive ability to discover the re-
lation between his or her behavior and the reaction of society 168
This ability depends on two factors. First, the child must be able
to recognize the message sent by the authority figure, a process
that presupposes adequate visual capacities."" Second, the child
must be able to experience negative emotions, a function typically
associated with the right-hemisphere of the brain. 7 0 Studies indi-
cate that many persistent deliquents suffer from neuropsychologi-
cal deficits that may seriously impair their capacities for avoidance
learning: deficits in ability to comprehend and recall, cognitive
dysfunctions, impaired vision, lack of ability to sustain levels of
concentration and attention,'7 ' or lack of normal lateralization and
specialization in the cerebral hemispheres. 72 Delinquents have also
been shown to have lower IQs than nondelinquents, especially in
verbal and reading performance, and frequently exhibit disorders
such as dyslexia, hyperactivity, language and attention deficit dis-
orders, perceptual and motor problems. 17 3
166. Buikhuisen, supra note 157, at 168.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 177-79.
169. Id. at 179.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Robert D. Hare & John F Connolly, Perceptual Assymmetries and Information
Processing in Psychopaths, in THE CAUSES OF CRIME, supra note 141, at 218, 234.
173. Buikhuisen, supra note 157, at 169.
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Once a learning deficit has become a prominent feature of the
child's personality, that disorder is compounded and exacerbated
by reactions of family, peers, and school personnel.17 4 For example,
a child who is psychologically unable to internalize the norms and
values of his social environment, and subsequently fails to obey the
rules, frequently will encounter criticism, neglect, and isolation in
his interpersonal relationships, which in turn can lead to adverse
effects on self-esteem and personality development. 17 5 Whether
such frustration manifests itself in the development of emotional
detachment and social indifference or in aggressive or deviant be-
havior is primarily a function of the interaction between individual
and situational factors.17 6 Yet despite the influence of environmen-
tal forces, studies identifying neurological deficits and dysfunctions
as the origins of the problem provide considerable support for rec-
ognizing a biological basis which may predispose an individual to
antisocial behavior.
Alcoholism
Alcoholism may seem to have a more attentuated effect on
human behavior than other genetic abnormalities, perhaps because
many external forces are determinative in the development of the
condition. Nonetheless, alcoholism is a physiological affliction
strongly correlated with criminality '77 Research has shown that al-
coholism has a direct effect on an individual's state of depression,
anxiety, and aggressive attitudes, and thereby has an indirect ef-
fect in the manifestion of criminal behavior. 17 Studies of murder,
rape, assault, and domestic abuse have reported that alcohol is a
factor in the majority of cases. 17 9 Moreover, current data supports
the theory that not only the occurrence, but also the nature of an
174. Fishbern & Thatcher, supra note 140, at 242.
175. See SAM GOLDSTEIN & MICHAEL GOLDSTEIN, MANAGING ATTENTION DISORDERS IN
CHILDREN 14-17 (1990).
176. Buikhuisen, supra note 157, at 181.
177. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 107-11.
178. Id.
179. Matti Virkkunen, Metabolic Dysfunctions Among Habitually Violent Offenders: Re-
active Hypoglocemla and Cholesterol Levels, in THE CAUSES OF CRIME, supra note 141, at
292, 305.
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individual's criminal act may be associated with alcohol abuse.8 0
For instance, crimes associated with alcohol abuse often involve vi-
olence and are committed against persons; crimes in the absence of
alcohol abuse are nearly always against property alone.'
Scientific consensus that certain types of alcoholism may be
based in physiology has prompted a closer examination of the rela-
tionship between the causes of alcoholism and crime.8 2 In the
words of one expert:
Given [the] widely documented facts, the criminal justice sys-
tem must take a very close look at the alcoholic in our society. If
alcohol is involved in a majority of crimes committed today, and
if a significant percentage of violent crimes are being committed
by individuals who exhibit a chronic need for alcohol, the ques-
tion must be asked: what causes alcoholism?' 8'
A link between alcoholism and genetics is virtually undis-
puted.' According to current statistics, familial transmission of
susceptibility to alcoholism is believed to be a significant factor in
at least forty percent of all alcoholism cases. 18 5 Children in families
with alcoholic parents have been found to be four to five times
more likely to become alcoholic than other children 8 6 and signifi-
cantly more likely to develop addiction problems and a variety of
mental health disorders.18 7
Studies have identified two different inheritance patterns for al-
coholism. Type I, or "milieu-limited" alcoholism, is found in mild
and severe forms in both sexes and is influenced by alcoholism m
both biological parents as well as by postnatal environmental fac-
180. Bohman et al., supra note 143, at 1233.
181. Id.
182. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 111.
183. Id.
184. Timothy F Kirn, Research Increasingly Focuses on Possible Genetic Factors in
Complex Problem of Alcohol Abuse, 261 JAMA 2170, 2170 (1989) ("Although there are
some dissenters from mainstream opinion, the consensus is that alcoholism is a heritable
disease with some basis in physiology.")
185. Donald I. MacDonald & Sheila B. Blume, CHILDREN OF ALCHOLICS, 140 AM. J. Dis-
EASES CHILDREN 750-54 (1986) (citing N.S. Cotton, The Familial Incidence of Alcoholism, 40
J. STUD. ALCOHOL 89, 89-116 (1979)).
186. Id. (citing Donald W Goodwin, Alcoholism and Genetics: The Sins of the Fathers,
42 ARCHivEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 171-74 (1985)).
187. Id. at 750.
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tors.'88 Type II, associated primarily with men, is strongly heredi-
table and correlated with severe alcoholism and criminality in the
biologic father alone.1"9
Type I alcoholics appear to require postnatal provocation in ad-
dition to genetic predisposition in order to express susceptibility to
alcoholism. 190 For the second subgroup, genetic influences seem to
outweigh environmental factors. 191 Type II individuals tended to
exhibit alcohol-seeking behavior early in life, to be impulsive and
risk taking, and to manifest coexisting psychiatric problems such
as aggression or criminality 192 For example, one study found that
individuals who experienced an onset of alcoholism before their
twentieth birthdays had a significantly higher incidence of paternal
alcoholism and were twice as likely to have been incarcerated for
crimes involving physical violence.193 Although the data suggests
that final expression of these traits depends on complex gene-envi-
ronment interactions, researchers nonetheless have concluded that
the risk for alcoholism is affected significantly by inborn, heredita-
ble factors.'
Having noted different behavioral patterns in alcoholics and
nonalcoholics, experts have proposed several explanations for the
biological basis of alcoholism. According to one theory, ethanol me-
tabolism is mediated by different patterns of genetically controlled
enzymes, thereby making tolerance to alcohol a function of one's
biological makeup.9 5 Another theory posits that persons with a ge-
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Laure Buydens-Branchey et al., Age of Alcoholism Onset; Relationship to Psychopa-
thology, 46 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 225-30 (1989).
191. Id., see also Roy W Pickens et al., Heterogeneity in the Inheritance of Alcoholism,
48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 19-28 (1991) (concurring that certain forms of alcoholism are
moderately, if not highly, hereditable).
192. Buydens-Branchey et al., supra note 190, at 225.
193. Id.
194. Stephen H. Dinwiddie & C. Robert Cloninger, Family and Adoption Studies in Al-
coholism and Drug Addiction, 21 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 206, 212 (1991).
195. MacDonald & Blume, supra note 185 (citing Marc A. Schuckit, A Prospective Study
of Genetic Markers in Alcoholism, in BIOLOGIC MARKERS IN PSYCHIATRY AND NEUROLOGY
445-54 (I. Hanin & E. Usden eds., 1983); Marc A. Schuckit, Self-Rating of Alcohol Intoxica-
tion by Young Men With and Without Family Histories of Alcoholism, 41 J. STUD. ALCOHOL
242-49 (1980)); see also Boris Tabakoff & Paula L. Hoffman, Genetics and Biological Mark-
ers of Risk for Alcoholism, 103 PuB. HEALTH REP. 690, 696-97 (1988), available in LEXIS,
Genmed library, PHR file.
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netic propensity for alcoholism may be deficient in certain forms of
biochemical activity required for optimal well-being; for these indi-
viduals, alcohol serves to temporarily correct the deficiency 196
More recently, and perhaps most significantly, a 1990 study sub-
stantiated the proposition that alcoholism may be linked to a spe-
cific chromosomal sequence"e' and reported the first allelic associa-
tion of a receptor gene with a certain subtype of alcoholism.198
Commenting on the finding's implications, one researcher involved
in the study remarked:
During the past three decades, research has shown that
the risk for [alcoholic] behavior is determined by genetic as
well as by environmental factors. The conclusion that there
is a significant genetic component to alcoholism has led to the
realization that individuals who are at risk of becoming alco-
holic, because of inherited factors, are biologically and behavior-
ally different from individuals who have few or no inherited fac-
tors that predispose them to alcoholism. 199
In spite of this particular discovery, experts acknowledge that
the heterogeneous nature of alcoholism may not allow for genera-
tion of a single marker that can identify all individuals at risk for
alcoholism.20 0 These experts similarly stress the critical interplay
of sociocultural factors, such as high domestic stress level, poor
196. Donald W Goodwin, Alcoholism and Genetics: The Sins of the Fathers, 42
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 171, 172 (1985). This theory finds that alcohol appears to in-
crease serotonergic activity during severe intoxication and subsequently reduces serotonm
activity to subnormal levels. Id. An alcoholic is thus induced to drink to correct both his
original "deficiency" and the even greater deficiency resulting from the biphasic effect of
alcohol on serotonin, perhaps explaining the "addictive cycle" in which "a person initially
drinks to feel good, then later drinks to stop feeling bad from the substance that originally
made him feel good." Id., see also Buydens-Branchey et al., supra note 190, at 226 (finding
alcohol-seeking behavior and aggressive and impulsive tendencies are associated with cen-
tral serotonergic levels).
197. Tabakoff & Hoffman, supra note 195, at 690.
198. Kenneth Blum et al., Allelic Association of Human Dopamine D2 Receptor Gene in
Alcoholism, 263 JAMA 2055, 2055 (1990). The presence of an allele of the dopamme recep-
tor gene correctly classified 77% of alcoholics, and its absence classified 72% of
nonalcoholics. "The polymorphic pattern of this receptor gene suggest[ed] that a gene that
confers susceptibility to at least one form of alcoholism is located on the q22-q23 region of
chromosome 11." Id.
199. Id. at 2058.




communication, permissiveness, undersocialization, neglect, vio-
lence, stigma, and denial of chemical dependency.201 Importantly,
however, many scientists have concluded that certain individuals,
because of their genetic predisposition, are at greater risk of devel-
oping a condition consistently associated with antisocial
behavior.0 2
REEXAMINATION OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Given the substantial growth of evidence implicating biological
bases for antisocial behavior, the concept of criminal responsibility
and the function of social punishment must be reevaluated. The
recent data raises several basic questions. First, should a genetic
"aberration" be considered a defense to, or mitigation of, a crimi-
nal charge?20 3 Second, what type of punishment, if any, should be
administered?204 Third, is our current legal system adequately pre-
pared to deal with evidence of genetic influences? As one critic
posited:
We have scientific means of establishing disorders of the brain,
and we can replace the concept of insanity with neurological
concepts of diseases of the brain. Such disorders must be
given some legal standing. Since the neurological conditions do
not constitute insanity or mental illness, new approaches must
be found and new scientific definitions of brain disorders estab-
lished. We must decide if such biological conditions are to be
treated as illness or punished as crimes. 05
Unlike genetic diseases where a single gene is thought to be responsible for
disease expression, the heterogeneous nature of alcoholism may not allow for
the generation of a single marker that can identify all individuals at risk.
[But] research that deals with the exploration of various candidate gene
probes, which encode elements related to the synthesis of neurotransmitters or
neuromodulators involved m the brain reward system, might ultimately lead to
multigene trait markers that can detect the susceptibility of individuals with a
family history of alcoholism.
Id.
201. Tabakoff & Hoffman, supra note 195, at 693.
202. Id.
203. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 140.
204. Id.
205. C.R. JEFFERY ET AL., ATTACKS ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE: BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY AND
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 117 (1985), quoted in NELKIN & TANcREDI, supra
note 10, at 157.
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Adequacy of Existing Defenses
Insanity
As illustrated in the XYY Syndrome cases, courts typically have
dealt with evidence of genetic abnormality by treating the condi-
tion like mental incapacity 206 Consequently, many courts have re-
duced the issue to whether the individual's genetic condition ren-
dered him legally insane at the time of the crime.207
In legal terms, "insanity" is not synonomous with mental illness,
but is instead a functional, nonmedical designation linking emo-
tional and cognitive capacities to specific behavior. 0 8 Thus, tests
for insanity focus on volition, the ability to conform one's behavior
to legal requirements, and cognition, the ability to understand or
appreciate the nature of one's conduct.20 9 Over the years, the legal
definition of, and tests for, insanity have varied, reflecting society's
changing tolerance, expectations, and evolving scientific
understanding. 210
Most courts follow one of three standards. To raise a successful
defense of insanity pursuant to the traditional M'Naghten rule,
the accused, at the time of committing an act, must be "labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."' 21'
Under the M'Naghten rule, legal insanity is characterized as a cog-
nitive rather than behavioral disorder, the determination of which
is concerned not with the ability to control conduct, but with the
individual's appreciation of the conduct's significance.212
Other courts have attempted to expand the scope of M'Naghten
to instances in which an individual possessed the cognitive under-
standing of right and wrong, but lacked the ability to control his or
her actions due to some mental disorder. These jurisdictions apply
the "product rule," first set forth in the case of Durham v. United
206. See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
208. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 10, at 136.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 137.
211. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
212. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 140-41.
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States.213 The product rule excuses unlawful acts if the acts are
shown to be the "product of mental disease or defect." '214
The third standard, the "substantial capacity" test adopted by
the American Law Institute in 1955, excuses criminal behavior if,
at the time of the conduct and as a result of mental disease or
defect, the accused "lacks [the] 'substantial capacity' [either] to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 'to conform his con-
duct' to the requirements of the law ,,215
"Guilty But Mentally Ill"
To accommodate less severe, but still cognizable, forms of im-
pairment, the legal system has developed defenses which do not
wholly exculpate the offender, but which instead reduce the degree
to which the individual should be punished for his acts. One such
mitigating device is the "guilty but mentally ill" ("GBMI") verdict:
if a judge or jury finds the defendant guilty but not legally insane
under the appropriate definition, they may alternatively find him
"guilty but mentally ill" at the time of offense.2 16
Like the insanity defense, this exception recognizes the possibil-
ity that human conduct may not always be attributed to the un-
restricted exercise of free will.21 7 Unlike the insanity defense, the
GBMI verdict does not completely excuse the offender from crimi-
nal responsibility 21 ' The individual is still held culpable and sub-
ject to punishment, but the court may take into account his im-
paired mental condition and order mitigation of the sentence or
treatment in prison or a mental hospital during the period of de-
213. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
214. Id. at 875. Although the initial rule neither limited mental disease or defect to severe
disorders nor required a close connection between the disorder and criminal act, courts soon
began to restrict its expansive interpretation. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 10, at 138.
Finally, in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit overturned Durham and formally embraced the American Law Institute's
"substantial capacity" test. Id.
215. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01C1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). Closely related to the
"substantial capacity" test is the "irresistable impulse" test. According to that test, an indi-
vidual is not responsible for her actions if they were caused by an impulse that the individ-
ual was unable to resist due to mental disease or defect. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 141.
216. Christopher Siobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time
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tention e19 Thus, the GBMI alternative represents an attempt to
reduce insanity acquittals and provide greater protection to the
public through a compromise verdict that offers both prolonged in-
carceration and treatment for the mentally ill offender.220
Diminished Responsibility or Capacity
Related to both the insanity and GBMI defenses, the diminished
responsibility or capacity theory strives to circumvent an all-or-
nothing approach by recognizing that an individual may not be in-
capacitated completely by a mental condition, yet still suffer an
impairment sufficient to warrant some limitation on accountabil-
ity 221 When a defendant pleads insanity, the issue is whether he
can be held criminally responsible for his acts. With diminished
responsibility, the issue becomes to what degree a person found
guilty of a criminal act should be held responsible for that act.2 22 A
successful insanity defense results in acquittal, or complete excul-
pation. A successful plea of diminished capacity, by contrast, ordi-
219. Id.
220. Id. Slobogin quotes Professor Simon who had conducted a study of jury reaction to
the insanity defense:
Many of the jurors [studied] felt constrained by the verdict limitations placed
upon them by the court. They would like to have a way of easing the choice
between acquitting the defendant on grounds of insanity and finding him
guilty. The former designation goes further than they want to go in distin-
guishing the defendant from the ordinary criminal, and the latter allows for no
distinction. In many instances, the jury would have liked to declare the de-
fendant guilty, but insane. That kind of verdict would permit the jurors to
condemn the defendant's behavior [and fulfill] their desire to commit the
defendant to an institution that both punished and treated.
Id. at 506 n.48 (quoting RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 178 (1967)).
221. Jonas Robitscher & Andrew K. Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EM-
ORY L.J. 9, 26 (1982) (citing Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Re-
sponsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 828
(1977)). Professor Arenella proposes two models of the diminished responsibility defense:
(1) the "mens rea" model in which the jury is asked to consider whether the sane defend-
ant's mental abnormality at the time of the crime prevented him from entertaining the
specific mental state prescribed by statute-success results in conviction of lesser offense,
and (2) the "formal litigation model," which permits the jury to mitigate the punishment of
a mentally disabled but sane offender in any case when it believes that the defendant is less
culpable than his normal counterpart who commits the same criminal act-success results in
mitigation of penalty for offense charged. Arenella, supra, at 828-29.
222. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 221, at 27 (citing Arenella, supra note 221, at 828).
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narily results in conviction for a lesser offense, typically one that
does not require the element of criminal intent.223
The Genetic Defense
Incorporation of Genetic Factors Within Existing Legal
Doctrines
As one critic distilled the issue:
[I]n assessing the suitability of an insanity-type defense to a ge-
netically influenced crime, the reasons behind society's provid-
ing that defense must be analyzed and measured for fit. A policy
decision has been made that no individual should suffer for con-
duct that is the result of a defect m reason or will. Assuming
that scientific evidence reveals that aberrations in genetic struc-
ture can cause a defect m one's ability to perceive or control
her[,] or her actions, should not the same policy apply 224
The sufficiency of scientific proof concerning the existence of an
aberration and the strength of a causal nexus between that condi-
tion and criminal behavior remain the two main obstacles to rais-
ing a successful defense based on biological status.225 Data gath-
ered from recent studies and projects such as the Human Genome
Initiative may overcome the first deficiency by providing more con-
clusive evidence of actual genetic or physiological abnormality 226
Subsequently, identification of a specific chromosomal sequence or
aberration or, alternatively, tests revealing abnormal neurological
or physiological activity, will provide more convincing evidence of
actual affliction than unsubstantiated or scientifically disputed
testimony
223. Id. at 28.
224. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 142.
225. See supra notes 48-137 and accompanying text.
226. Although mapping of the human gene began early in the twentieth century, it has
been vigorously pursued only for the last two decades. According to official projections,
"mapping" of the twenty-three pairs of chromosomes should be completed within the first
five to ten years of the Human Genome Project, and sequencing of the DNA within fifteen
years. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NEW TOOLS FOR
TOMORROW'S HEALTH RESEARCH 4 (1991); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEATH & HUMAN SERVS. &
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, UNDERSTANDING OUR GENETIC INHERITENCE, THE U.S. HUMAN GENOME
PROJECt. THE FIRST FIvE YEARS 9-11 (1990).
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The causal nexus hurdle may prove more difficult to surmount.
Although studies have shown consistent correlation between cer-
tain conditions and criminal behavior, they have not produced de-
finitive evidence regarding the nature and extent of causation.22
Indeed, many experts warn that in seeking to identify the root
causes of physical or behavioral symptoms and to predict future
conditions in the absence of manifest symptoms, correlation can
easily be misperceived as causation, especially by nonscientists us-
ing the tests for policy purposes.228 In other words, the presence of
a genetic or biological condition may be confused with inevitable
expression of the actual disease.2 2
Moreover, most genetic disorders are polygenic, or the product
of the interaction of several genes with a person's environment. 30
Thus, even if a test can detect with complete reliability a gene, a
cluster of genes, or an extra chromosome, it will not necessarily
provide information about the timing or severity of a disability or
how it might affect the normal functioning of the afflicted individ-
ual.2"' "Tests that identify genetic traits are intrinsically incapable
of accounting for other variables-diet, lifestyle, the effect of envi-
ronmental or social interactions-that may influence their manifes-
tation in disease. "232
Indeed, antisocial behaviors are not invariably or inherently dys-
functional, nor do they necessarily impair one's ability to perform
adequately in a given social context. 3 3 Genetic and environmental
effects may be "additive," that is, the total risk is the sum of aver-
age individual contributions, or "non-additive," the total risk de-
pends on specific combinations of the individual's genotype and
environment.234 Most experts insist that the evaluation of criminal
behavior requires an analysis of both biological factors and envi-
ronmental factors.23 6
227. Denno, supra note 138, at 649.
228. NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 10, at 38.
229. Id. at 39.
230. Id. at 41.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 43.
233. Fishbein & Thatcher, supra note 140, at 241.
234. Cloninger & Gottesman, supra note 142, at 106-07.
235. Fishbemn & Thatcher, supra note 140, at 242. Biological factors include the integrity
of the central nervous system, genetic predispositions, diet, toxins, prenatal care, and head
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Consequently, while the presence and methods of identifying
particular biological deficiencies are increasingly accepted within
the relevant scientific fields, and thus may qualify to be introduced
as evidence at trial, mere proof of the existence of a "defect" may
still be inadequate to relieve one from criminal responsibility Neu-
rological or psychophysiological deficits may be directly responsi-
ble for the subsequent development of an antisocial personality
disorder, but given the undeniable interplay of environmental fac-
tors m this formative process, the question remains as to what ex-
tent biological and social forces can be separated and assigned
practical significance. Relatedly, the defendant likely will encoun-
ter difficulty in establishing a sufficient degree of "compulsion,"
the legal criteria of the insanity tests." 6
Creation or Rejection of Genetic Defense
If existing legal doctrines prove inadequate in determining re-
sponsibility in light of genetic factors, one solution might be to rec-
ognize a new defense based on biological aberration. In addition to
the noted difficulty of establishing the degree and extent of causa-
tion, this option presents several other problems, such as incom-
plete knowledge and threat to social order and welfare.
Not only have experts been unable to identify definitive and pre-
dictable causal relations between certain conditions and subse-
quent behavioral manifestations, but they also remain unsure as to
how many forms of genetic aberration actually exist. 3 7 Thus, de-
fenses based on biological abnormality would risk an impartial dis-
tribution of justice if other, comparably severe deficiencies have
not yet been sufficiently documented or have been fortuitously left
out of scientists' models. s
trauma. Environmental factors would include income, the quality of housing, socioeconomic
status, education level of the parents, and rearing practices. Id.
236. For instance, the disorder would have to be of sufficient severity to overcome one's
ability to reason or substantial capacity to control his or her actions.
237. Denno, supra note 138, at 661.
238. Id., see also Moore, supra note 29, at 1118. Professor Moore refers to this system as
"ignorance determinism," in which "what determines an actor's responsibility is not the
degree to which the actor is caused to act, but rather the degree to which we have knowl-
edge of the causes of his action." Id. Moore finds this theory inadequate and "inconsistent
with our basic moral beliefs to attribute responsibility according to our present, completely
fortuitous, state of knowledge." Id. at 1119.
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Critics contend that in addition to the inevitable empirical dis-
tortions, creation of new defenses would threaten the social control
function of law.2 s3 They argue that expanding the concept of legal
incapacity would compromise deterrent effects, involve speculative
and uncertain proof, and invite erroneous and subjective acquit-
tals.24 These compelling evidentiary and policy concerns justify
excluding consideration of physiological abnormality But, as the
evidence of biological correlations with certain behavior becomes
more compelling, do these state interests outweigh an accused's
fundamental right to present evidence of external influences?241
A system which denies excuse to those who suffer biological dis-
orders not satisfying the criteria of legal insanity implicitly de-
mands that these persons be held criminally responsible for their
behavior. Whereas society may not find this abstract concept too
disturbing when weighed against the countervailing objectives of
safety and order, the determination of suitable punishment poses a
more troublesome dilemma.
As discussed earlier, penalties for the "normal" offender may be
justified by the goals of retribution, deterrence, isolation, and reha-
bilitation.242 Incarcerating the biologically impaired individual,
however, serves these objectives imperfectly, if at all. If a definite
link is established between the presence of a biological condition
and antisocial behavior, society will be faced with an individual
who may not be able to control his behavior or be rehabilitated by
imprisonment, and whose biological propensity for antisocial be-
havior is not "curable. '243
Theoretically, society would gain little satisfaction in seeking
retribution against one who is neither responsible for, nor capable
of changing, his physical constitution. Under such circumstances,
239. Kadish, supra note 21, at 284.
240. Id.
241. Susan F Mandiberg, Protecting Society and Defendants Too: The Constitutional
Dilemma of Mental Abnormality and Intoxication Defenses, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 221, 230
(1984). According to Mandiberg, insufficient mental state may not be effectively proved un-
less admitted by a defendant: most jurors are willing to assume that a person who acts in a
certain way intends both his behavior and whatever results naturally flow from such behav-
ir. Id. at 232. This finding will be virtually automatic unless something causes the juror to
question it in a particular context. Id.
242. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
243. See Kessler, supra note 51, at 893.
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retribution would be, in effect, exacting vengeance for a birth de-
fect.244 As for deterrence, effectiveness assumes that a criminal re-
flects rationally on the potential consequences of his acts.245 If the
offender's behavior is to some extent driven by factors beyond his
understanding or control, however, to what extent would threat of
punishment be effective? 246
Similarly, the concept of rehabilitation is based on a questiona-
ble assumption-that conduct is environmentally caused and is ca-
pable of modification.2 47 This theory does not contemplate that
some conditions, such as genetic traits, are not naturally suscepti-
ble to change.2 4 Could society insist on genetic alteration such as
psychosurgery or pharmalogical medication to "cure" a genetic
defect?249
Finally, isolation or incarceration would not correct the individ-
ual's disorder; indeed, it may make him more antisocial by com-
pounding a biological dysfunction with negative environmental in-
fluences. Furthermore, confinement presents ethical and economic
problems. 50 Is it moral to remove an individual from society be-
cause of an inborn defect, and should personal rights and liberties
be compromised for a "greater social good"9 251 Does committance
until "cured" signify permanent, state-provided
institutionalization? 252
Creation of a New Paradigm
Given the disparate functions of law and science, models of
human behavior based exclusively on either free will or determin-
ism prove problematic. On the one hand, an assumption that all
individuals possess similar control over their actions directly con-
flicts with evidence demonstrating different genetic susceptibili-
244. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 144.
245. Id. at 12.
246. Id. at 144-45.
247. Id. at 15.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 145.
250. Id. at 11.
251. Id. at 145-46.
252. Id. at 146.
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ties.25 On the other hand, an assumption that all actions are
caused by factors beyond our control effectively eliminates per-
sonal accountability in a system that predicates punishment upon
moral blame.254
Some theories attempt to reconcile determinism and free will.
"Degree determinism," for instance, denies that all human actions
are fully caused; instead, a continuum exists in which different ac-
tions can be more or less determined and thus are more or less
free.255 Certain factors predispose individuals to specific behavior,
but do not operate as either a necessary or a sufficient condition
for that behavior.2 56 Degree determinism, or a "conditional free
253. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
254. Moore, supra note 29, at 1092. Under the causal theory, external causes merit excul-
pation. Therefore, if every person who committed a criminal offense were granted an excuse
based on "external cause," the result would be an effective elimination of moral and crmun-
nal responsibility. According to Moore, although the French proverb "tout comprendre, c'est
tout pardonner" (to understand all is to forgive all) may sound attractive to a "civilized"
society, strict application of this precept would emasculate any system of law enforcement.
Id.
Kadish similarly rejects expanding the scope of excuse. Such defenses would be difficult to
administer, would weaken the law's deterrent effect, and once recognized, would make any
punishment hard to justify, "for even evil has its causal roots somewhere." Kadish, supra
note 21, at 284. Kadish argues that external factors
may well establish a credible explanation of how the defendant has come to
have the character he has. But it does not establish a moral excuse any more
than a legal one, for there is a difference between explaining a person's wrong-
ful behavior and explaining it away.
The reason [these factors] fail to make out a moral excuse is that [they]
fail to establish the breakdown of rationality and judgment that is incom-
patible with moral agency.
Id.
255. Moore, supra note 29, at 1114 (citing Norval Morris' hypothesis that completely free
and completely determined actions are ideal types, or "polar conditions," between which all
actions in the real world lie).
256. Id. at 1116 (citing Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsi-
bility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 1031 (1982)). A similar model bal-
ances "predisposing" and "facilitating" factors against the "inhibiting" variables present in
one's environment. Denno, supra note 138, at 664 (citing the model suggested by Professor
Wouter Buikhuisen at the International Interdisciplinary Group on Criminology workshop
in November 1976). "Predisposing" variables would include biological influences that "in-
crease the likelihood of, and may account for, a significant portion of criminal behavior." Id.
These influences, if combined with "facilitating" variables such as drug and alcohol use,
provocation, availability of weapons, environmental and social context, further increase the
probability of criminal behavior. Id. "Inhibiting" factors, such as internalization or social-
ethical norms, autonomic nervous system responses such as fear and guilt, and the desire to
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will" theory,25 7 is based on probabilities. "[N]umerous causes or al-
ternatives are presented to explain an effect[, with] each cause
hav[ing] a certain probability of resulting in that outcome. '258
When certain factors make the probabilities of deviant behavior
strong enough, responsibility is excused. 59
A model integrating the influences of free will and determinism
would not necessarily overturn or undermine existing foundations
of the legal system. Although a revised paradigm would recognize
empirical data demonstrating that genetic conditions may predis-
pose the development and manifestations of antisocial behavior, it
would not foreclose automatically the possibility of an appreciable
degree of free will, or preclude the imposition of social regulation
based upon that residual self-control.
In sum, to deny that biological aberrations and dysfunctions ex-
ert some influence on an individual's decisions and actions in cer-
tain environments would be to dispute scientific reality With the
trend of modern genetic research, science will now, or in the near
future, be able to satisfy courts' demands for sufficiently substanti-
ated and accepted proof of actual genetic disorders.
This recognition of biological determinism need not require the
adoption of a constitutional or special "genetic defense." Because
an individual may be more vulnerable to developing a chemical ad-
diction or an antisocial personality disorder does not mean that
that individual in fact will develop those conditions, or that the
avoid punishment, operate to offset the other influences and decrease the probability of
manifesting criminal behavior. Id.
257. Fishbem, supra note 10, at 30. According to this theory, human behavior is contin-
gent on a number of possible alternatives from which the individual may choose. Id. This
choice, however, is limited by "preset boundaries" such as opportunities and resources,
learning experiences, physiological abilities, and genetic predispositions. Thus, the theory of
conditional free will does not demand a deterministic view of human behavior, but rather
posits that individuals choose a course of action within a preset, yet to some degree variable,
range of possibilities. Id. at 30-31.
Assuming conditions are amenable to rational thought, individuals are expected to adapt
to the circumstances and are held accountable for their actions. Id. If one or more condi-
tions to which the individual is exposed are disturbed or irregular, however, the individual is
more likely to choose a disturbed or irregular course of action. Id. Thus, a child with a
learning disability initially may function adequately in society, but if confronted with nega-
tive environmental factors such as family instability, or lack of appropriate educational pro-
grams, that child may be more prone to maladaptive or criminal behavior. Id.
258. Id. at 30.
259. Moore, supra note 29, at 1116.
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individual has absolutely no control over such development. The
existence of a genetic condition merely provides more insight into
whether a person possessed enough free will or rational ability to
control and understand her behavior.2 60
The difficulty with a model of degree determinism, then, is two-
fold: separating the causal factors to assess their relative contribu-
tions261 and identifying the "baseline" of criminal responsibil-
ity-the point in the continuum of free will and causation in which
responsibility ends and excuse begins.26 2 Science cannot now, and
may not in the near future, assign exact probabilities or make de-
finitive causal connections between genetic abnormalities and
human behavior .26  To summarily dismiss the probative value of
an individual diagnosis because of this lack of certainty, however,
is unwarranted. Instead, courts should admit evidence of a medi-
cally diagnosable disorder as a relevant factor in determining
260. See Kadish, supra note 21, at 284. To the argument that addiction is a sickness that
requires treatment and not punishment, Kadish responds:
Being "sick" in this sense does not mean or imply that the person is irresponsi-
ble and not morally culpable. Just as a psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness
does not itself establish a defense of legal insanity, neither does a diagnosis of
addiction establish that the addict is not responsible for his actions. The con-
cept of disease of the mind as it functions in the insanity defense does not
simply represent a medical treatment category. [I]t is rather a judgment
that the person suffers from such a persistent distortion of his powers of judg-
ment and practical reasoning that he lacks moral agency.
Id. at 286 (footnote omitted).
Kadish further rejects categorization of addiction as an "involuntary act"- "There are
enough conscious, purposive actions in the characteristic behavior of addicts (including ab-
stinence when the motivation is great enough) that it cannot possibly be considered involun-
tary." Id. at 286-87. An underlying premise of Kadish's argument is that "persons of reason-
able firmness do not become addicted," or that "[s]ave in the rarest of cases, [the addict]
must have voluntarily consumed narcotics over a period of time before becoming addicted.
Therefore his problem is almost always in some sense of his own making." Id. at 287.
261. Fishbein, supra note 10, at 30.
262. Moore, supra note 29, at 1114. Moore notes that different adherents to "degree de-
terminism" draw the baseline at different points. Id. For example, some insist that persons
raised in conditions of "gross social adversity" still retain enough freedom to be fairly pun-
ished for their misdeeds. Id. More "liberal" proponents tend to draw the baseline lower on
the continuum of degrees of causation, and believe that "[s]ince the actions of both the
mentally ill and the socially deprived are sufficiently determined, both should be excused."
Id. at 1115.
263. See supra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
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whether an individual possessed the requisite amount of control or
understanding of his behavior to be held legally responsible. 264
Again, although the putative "free will" basis of criminal respon-
sibility must be reassessed and reformulated to acknowledge a
greater degree of determinism, that acknowledgement need not re-
sult in an abandonment of the fundamental standards by which an
individual is held accountable for his actions. Adherence to intel-
lectual honesty may require simply an admission that the criminal
justice system is not based solely on attribution of moral blame.
Society may decide that, in some instances, the need for civil order
and protection may override subjective culpability as a justification
for criminal sanctions.265
Unquestionably, a minimal level of conformity is a prerequisite
for orderly human interaction; underconformity, or lawlessness,
threatens the core of civilized society 266 Consequently, the State
attaches a broad responsibility to the condition of citizenship: per-
sons within the jurisdiction must obey the law.267 Ordinarily, both
the intention and the ability to do otherwise are necessary for full
moral responsibility But the two elements are not always required
264. Several legal scholars have proposed models which determine guilt according to the
degree to which external factors overcome rational thought and action. See Moore, supra
note 29, at 1135-49; see also Kadish, supra note 21, at 262-63* Professor Moore, for example,
posits that an essential prerequisite to personhood is the capacity to engage in practical
reasoning capacities; the "freedom" required for responsibility is the power to give effect to
one's choices or desires. Moore, supra note 29, at 1148-49. "Compulsion," or something or
someone that interferes with that practical reasoning, should be the sole basis for excuse. Id.
Accordingly, some causal factors, such as genetic abnormalities, may be grounds for mitiga-
tion, but they do not necessarily excuse voluntary action. Id. Even if the correlation between
certain genetic conditions and criminal behavior can be substantiated to the point of infer-
ring a "but for" causal connection, the fact that the individual still had the opportunity and
capacity to act otherwise disqualifies him from excuse. Id. Thus, defenses inherently are
limited: a claim of incapacity to comply with law because of defect of understanding or self-
control would be an excuse only if it were the result of a mental disease, or so complete a
breakdown of the human capacities of judgment and practical reason that the afflicted per-
son could not fairly be held liable. Id.
265. See Peter R. Dahl, Comment, Legal and Psychiatric Concepts and the Use of Psy-
chtatric Evidence in Criminal Trials, 73 CAL. L. REV. 411, 412 (1985) (stating that "no mat-
ter how much information psychiatry provides about criminal behavior, legal policymakers
will continue to enact laws with an eye toward protecting society").
266. THE CAUSES OF CRIME, supra note 141, at ix.
267. RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 21
(1986).
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for the ascription of legal responsibility A particular responsibility
rule may require both elements, either one, or neither.268
Accordingly, responsibility may be defined in consideration of
social welfare: offenders should be deemed "responsible" for their
crimes at the point at which social utility is maximized.69 Utilita-
rian theories of punishment do not require that an actor be respon-
sible in a morally significant sense. An individual's metaphysical or
psychological condition at the time of the act is not the appropri-
ate focus. Rather, the inquiry is whether punishment will serve any
societal interest.270 If society finds punishing an individual for
crimes for which he is not responsible in the traditional sense to be
morally offensive, then the punishment cannot be justified unless
it is outweighed by a greater good. 1 In short, the rightness or
wrongness of action can be measured by its consequences. 2  While
incarceration of a genetically afflicted offender would not serve the
traditional objectives of retribution and deterrence, society none-
theless may determine that the isolation function outweighs these
factors pursuant to a utilitarian concept of responsibility Although
an individual, through no fault of her own, may be born with an
immutable predisposition to behavior that society has deemed un-
acceptable, in some cases the normative ends-for example, remov-
ing a potentially dangerous offender from the street-may justify
the morally debatable means.
CONCLUSION
Virtually every modern expert would agree that both environ-
mental and social forces play essential roles in shaping an individ-
ual's attitudes and conduct. The influence of biological factors, an
idea long disfavored and feared by those who recall the skewed
theories of primitive social Darwinists and the atrocities of Nazi
eugenics, has reemerged in light of abundant scientific evidence
showing it to be a significant component of human behavior and
development. Studies have linked genetics to psychophysiological
268. Id. at 27-28.
269. Hill, supra note 39, at 2066.
270. Id. at 2064.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 2064 n.79.
[Vol. 35:353
GENETIC DEFENSE
underarousal, neurological and chemical imbalances, and alcohol-
ism-all conditions which potentially predispose an individual to
antisocial behavior.
Our current legal system is founded upon principles of criminal
responsibility and punishment that assume a certain amount of
free will. Consequently, excuse from legal culpability depends upon
the demonstration of factors which prevented the actor from exer-
cising that free will. Proof of biological influences on human behav-
ior poses a fundamental challenge to these notions: can a person be
held accountable for an inborn trait over which he has little or no
knowledge or control? And perhaps the more difficult question: to
what degree do these traits affect a person's ability to recognize or
control his behavior9
In the past, courts have rejected defenses based on biological
predisposition on the grounds of insufficient evidence of affliction
and inconclusive proof of causation. Recent and prospective scien-
tific progress may overcome the former shortcoming, but the latter
dilemma remains a point of speculation. In light of the gap be-
tween identifying actual genetic aberration and demonstrating ade-
quate causal connection, the legal system must determine how
much weight, if any, to give each factor.
Regardless of whether courts or legislatures decide to consider
evidence of biological abnormality as a legal excuse, as a mitigating
factor during sentencing, or as having no negativing effect on guilt,
traditional concepts of individual responsibility and social justifi-
cation must be restated in terms that reflect scientific reality. The
model of free will must be reconsidered in light of increasing sup-
port for deterministic influences. If moral culpability no longer
serves as the basis for penalizing an offender, society must recog-
nize that social utility may be the more predominant concern. In
any respect, evidence of "genetic factors in crime" cannot be ig-
nored. Although simplistic or reductionist theories must be dis-
credited and avoided, society must address the ethical, social, and
legal implications that accompany a greater understanding of the
human body and mind.
Maureen P Coffey
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